

Message Text

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TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE

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S E C R E T STATE 002837 TOSEC 130166

NODIS

FOL RPT AMMAN 0111 SENT ACTION SECSTATE DTD 05 JAN 78

QUOTE: S E C R E T AMMAN 0111

NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS SECRETARY'S PARTY

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PGOV, JO, XF, OVIP (CARTER, JIMMY)

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH SAUDIS AND SADAT

REF: (A) SECTO 13093, (B) SECTO 13102

SUMMARY: I SAW KING AFTERNOON JANUARY 5 AND PASSED ON MESSAGE.

KING SAID THAT HE DID NOT AGREE THAT JORDAN SHOULD PARTICIPATE

IN JOINT SUPERVISION OF WEST BANK IF THAT MEANT WORKING FROM

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BEGIN PLAN. I SAID THAT CONTEXT WAS IN TERMS OF A TRANSITIONAL
REGIME WHICH PRESUMABLY MEANT ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. HE SAID
THEN IT WAS POSSIBLE FOR JORDAN TO MOVE IN BEHIND THE ISRAELIS
BUT AN ISRAELI-JORDANIAN CONDOMINIUM WAS NOT POSSIBLE. KING
ALSO SAID THAT HE COULD AGREE WITH MINOR BORDER RECTIFICATIONS
ONLY PROVIDED THEY WERE RECIPROCAL AND THAT HE WANTED US TO
BE SURE THAT HE DID NOT FAVOR AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE

SINCE WE HAD INDICATED TO SAUDIS WE COULD NOT SPEAK FOR HIM ON THIS POINT. HE HAS RECEIVED LONG LETTER FROM SADAT WHICH IS DISAPPOINTED IN BEGIN'S HARD LINE AND INDIRECTLY IN US FOR NOT HELPING MORE. KING SAID HE OBJECTS STRONGLY TO SADAT IDEA PASSED TO HIM BY SAUDI PRINCE TURKI THAT EGYPT SHOULD GUARANTEE GAZA AND JORDAN WEST BANK IN TERMS OF GOOD BEHAVIOR AND SECURITY. KING SAID PALESTINIAN SOLUTION MUST BE GENUINE AND CANNOT BE RETURN TO PRE-1967 WHEN GAZA AND WEST BANK WERE SPLIT. UNITY OF THESE TWO AREAS IS ESSENTIAL AND SADAT PROPOSAL WORKS AGAINST THAT PRINCIPLE. KING HAS NO INVITATION FROM SADAT DESPITE LATTER'S PUBLIC STATEMENTS, BUT WOULD GO IF WAY IS OPEN. END SUMMARY.

1. KING WAS AVAILABLE TO SEE ME LATE AFTERNOON OF JANUARY 5. I SAW HIM ALONE TO DELIVER YOUR MESSAGE AND THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER OF THANKS. HE READ THE MESSAGE ON THE SAUDI AND SADAT MEETINGS WITH CARE AND WE DISCUSSED IT AT SOME LENGTH BEING JOINED BY SHARAF AND CROWN PRINCE HASSAN AS THE MEETING WENT ON. LATER I DELIVERED THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE AND THE KING ASKED ME TO HIS EXPRESS HIS THANKS AND APPRECIATION TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGES AND YOUR CONSIDERATION IN KEEPING HIM INFORMED.

2. AFTER READING THE MESSAGE ON THE PRESIDENT'S MEETINGS HE SAID THAT HE COULD ALSO AGREE WITH THE SAUDIS AND DISAGREED THEREFORE WITH US ON THE POINT (PARA 5 REFTEL A) REGARDING JOINT SUPERVISION INCLUDING JORDAN. HE SAID THAT IF THIS

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WAS TO INVOLVE NEGOTIATING ON THE BEGIN PLAN AND ACCEPTING THE IDEA OF ISRAELI CONTROL OVER SECURITY, WITH JORDAN CARRYING OUT THEIR ORDERS, THEN IT WAS NOT ON. HE ASKED WHAT I THOUGHT, AND I TOLD HIM I THOUGHT IT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL FOR JORDAN TO REMAIN FLEXIBLE ABOUT PARTICIPATING IN A TRANSITIONAL REGIME WHICH WOULD BE GENUINELY TRANSITIONAL TO ISRAELI WITHDRAWALS. HUSSEIN THEN SAID THAT IF JORDAN WERE REPLACING ISRAEL THAT WOULD BE ONE THING, BUT IF IT WERE MERELY A COVER FOR ISRAEL STAYING ON, HE COULD NOT ACCEPT IT. HE ALSO NOTED THAT JORDAN WOULD BE INFINITELY MORE COMFORTABLE, IN THE CONTEXT OF THE POINT WHICH THE SAUDIS MADE ABOUT INSURING THE IMPARTIALITY OF SELF DETERMINATION, NOT TO BE IN THE WEST BANK WHEN AN ELECTION OR REFERENDUM TOOK PLACE AMONG PALESTINIANS. KING PROFESSED TO SEE IN THIS POINT WHICH WE MADE ABOUT "JOINT SUPERVISION" SOMETHING WHICH WAS APPARENTLY SUGGESTED TO HIM BY OUR QUESTIONS IN TEHRAN ABOUT WHETHER THE KING SAW ANY POSITIVE ELEMENTS IN THE BEGIN PLAN. KING SAID THAT HIS VERY NEGATIVE ANSWER AT THE MEETING PARALLELED WHAT HE HAD TOLD THE PRESIDENT IN PRIVATE.

3. A SECOND POINT CONCERNED THE STATEMENT (IN PARAGRAPH 3 OF REFTEL A) ABOUT MINOR BORDER RECTIFICATIONS IN THE AREA

CLOSEST TO THE MEDITERRANEAN. THE KING SAID THAT I SHOULD MAKE SURE THAT WE UNDERSTAND THIS MEANS THAT RECTIFICATIONS ARE MADE ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS. HE HAS IN THE PAST MADE THIS POINT. IT HAS NOT BEEN SPELLED OUT FOR ME IN DETAIL, BUT I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT HE EXCLUDES NON-TERRITORIAL CONCESSIONS BY THE ISRAELIS FROM THE CONTEXT OF RECIPROCITY AS HE TALKS ABOUT IT HERE. I.E. USE OF ISRAEL MEDITERRANEAN PORTS BY JORDAN.

4. KING ALSO NOTED THAT HE FELT THAT POINT (IN PARAGRAPH 4 OF REFTTEL A) THAT HUSSEIN DID NOT ACCEPT DANGER OF AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE MADE BY KING KHALID IMPLIED WE WERE NOT CERTAIN THAT HE OPPOSED SUCH A STATE. HE HAS OF COURSE NOT SAID SO IN PUBLIC HIMSELF AND HAS SAID THAT HE WOULD LIVE WITH THE RESULTS OF AN ACT OF SELF DETERMINATION WHICH COULD INCLUDE THAT
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ALTERNATIVE. HOWEVER HE DID NOT OBJECT TO BEING ASSOCIATED AFTER TEHRAN WITH THE VIEWS OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE SHAH ON THIS POINT, AND HE REPEATED FOR ME HIS BELIEF THAT SUCH AN OUTCOME WOULD BE DANGEROUS.

5. THE KING SAID THAT HE WOULD SHORTLY BE SENDING HIS PRIME MINISTER TO SAUDI ARABIA. HE RECALLED THAT HE HAD RAISED WITH THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY HIS HOPE THAT THEY WOULD TALK TO THE SAUDIS ABOUT HIS MILITARY NEEDS. SINCE IT WAS NOT IN THE REPORT I GAVE HIM, HE WONDERED IF THEY HAD HAD TIME TO RAISE THIS QUESTION, AND IF SO WHAT THEY HAD SAID AND WHAT HAD THE SAUDI REACTION BEEN?

6. ON THE SADAT PORTION OF THE TRIP, HE TOLD ME IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION, THAT HE HAD RECEIVED A LONG AND DETAILED REPORT FROM PRESIDENT SADAT ON HIS MEETINGS WITH THE ISRAELIS. WHILE HE FOUND NOTHING IN IT UNUSUAL OR SURPRISING HE DID NOTE THAT PRESIDENT SADAT SAID THAT WHILE HE HAD EXPECTED BAGIN TO BE TOUGH, HE WAS SHOCKED AT THE DEGREE OF ISRAELI INTRASIGANCE ON THE WEST BANK/GAZA. THE MESSAGE CARRIED WITH IT A SENSE OR FLAVOR OF DISAPPOINTMENT OVER THE FAILURE OF THE US TO HAVE BROUGHT BEGIN FURTHER ALONG IN HIS THINKING.

7. KING ALSO TOLD ME THAT SAUDI PRINCE TURKI BIN FIESAL, DEPUTY CHIEF OF INTELLIGENCE, HAD COME TO BRIEF HIM ON THE RIYADH MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT CARTER. TURKI STOPPED IN ASWAN TO SEE SADAT FIRST. HE WAS THEN TO GO TO DAMASCUS BUT BROKE HIS JOURNEY IN AMMAN INSTEAD. TURKI'S BRIEFING HAD FOLLOWED OURS CLOSELY ON THE SAUDI VISIT. TURKI TOLD HUSSEIN THAT SADAT RAISED WITH HIM THE IDEA THAT TO PLEASE ISRAELIS EGYPT COULD BECOME THE GUARANTOR FOR GAZA AND JORDAN THE WEST BANK. KING WAS VAGUE ON WHAT THEY WERE TO GUARANTEE, BUT IT APPEARS TO BE SECURITY FOR ISRAEL. KING OBJECTED HOTLY TO THIS. HIS POINT IS INTERESTING AND
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SOMEWHAT UNEXPECTED: THE WEST BANK AND GAZA SHOULD BE TOGETHER IN ANY SOLUTION FOR THE PALESTINIANS. MAKING THEM SEPARATE "PROTECTORATES" AGAIN AS IN PRE-1967 DAYS WOULD ONLY PULL THEM APART. IF A GUARANTOR IS NEEDED LET ONE ARAB STATE DO IT, JORDAN OR EGYPT. THE TWO REGIONS NEED TO PROCEED ON A JOINED BASIS, NOT ONE SUBJECT TO THE OLD DIVISIONS BETWEEN EGYPT AND JORDAN. BOTH SHOULD HAVE APPLIED TO THEM JOINTLY THE PRINCIPLES IN SADAT'S KNESSET SPEECH. KING SAID HE ASSUMED THAT SADAT'S PUBLIC MENTION OF IMPENDING JORDANIAN VISIT WAS ON BASIS OF WHAT PRESIDENT TOLD SADAT (PARA 12 REFTEL A), BUT THAT HE HAD NOT YET RECEIVED AN INVITATION. THE SAME WENT FOR RIYADH (PARA 4 REFTEL A); HE LOOKED FORWARD TO VISITING BOTH CAPITALS.

8. REFTEL (B) ARRIVED JUST AFTER I HAD RETURNED FROM THE PALACE. I GAVE KING HUSSEIN THE CORRECTIONS OVER THE TELEPHONE AND HE THANKED ME FOR THEM. HE SAID HE HAD NOT QUITE UNDERSTOOD WHAT WAS MEANT BY THE PHRASE AND WOULD STUDY IT FURTHER NOW THAT HE HAD THE CORRECTION.

9. KING DID RAISE THE ISSUE OF SADAT'S ANNOUNCEMENT ON NEXT STEPS. I TOLD HIM THAT FROM THE CONTEXT OF THE MESSAGE (REFTEL A), I ASSUMED THAT IT MEANT THAT A DECLARATION WOULD BE WORKED ON AT JERUSALEM. I SAID I WOULD CONFIRM THIS FOR HIM AND HE ASKED THAT I DO SO. HE ADDED THAT HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE A MIRACLE IF WE COULD GET ISRAELIS AROUND TO ANYTHING NEAR ACCEPTABLE TO SADAT (AND THE OTHER ARABS) AT JERUSALEM BUT HE WAS SURE THAT WE WERE RIGHT TO TRY TO DO ALL WE COULD TO GET SOMETHING WORKED OUT.

10. ACTION REQUESTED: SOMETHING BACK FOR ME ON WHETHER WE SPOKE TO SAUDIS ON MILITARY QUESTION (PARA 5 ABOVE) AND ANY FURTHER CLARIFICATION ON OUR INTENTIONS REGARDING A DECLARATION (PARA 9 ABOVE).

11. SUGGEST DEPARTMENT REPEAT TO JIDDA, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS AND TEHRAN. PICKERING UNQUOTE CHRISTOPHER

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